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1 We Don't Intend to be Party
Poopers!
People who read and write about poverty in poor
countries have cause to celebrate. Poverty is back
on the international development agenda - per-
haps higher than it has ever been, Working through
the OECD, the major aid donors have committed
themselves to a series of social development targets
that include halving, by 2015, the proportion of
people in developing countries who live in extreme
poverty Bilateral aid donors, animated in particular
by Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for
International Development, have defined poverty
reduction as the aid and development goal. Irs 2001
the World Bank will publish a decennial World
Development Report on Poverty that will reflect a
more generous and flexible attitude to defining
poverty and understanding its causes and remedies
than did its predecessor, the 1990 Report. The
1990 Report elevated into international develop-
ment orthodoxy the conservative New Poverty
Agenda, comprising pro-poor growth', better pub-
lic services for the poor, and safety nets' (only) for
those who really need them. That New Poverty
Agenda, along with many other neo-liberal ortho-
doxies of the 1980s and early 1990s, is withering
before our eyes. We are in the midst of rapid polit-
ical and ideological shifts at the global level and
within the domain of international development
policy Whatever the outcome, we can at least cele-
brate the opportunity to help define anti-poverty
policies that are less narrow and mean in spirit than
the save-taxpayers-money-at-all-costs ideas that
inspired neo-liberal policies. Why then are we talk-
ing of spoiling the party rather than joining it?
There are three reasons.
First, what we have to celebrate is a change in atti-
tude and policy in international aid and develop-
ment organisations, not some great breakthrough
in actually doing anything to reduce poverty
Second, the influence of neo-liberalism does not dis-
appear once World Bank Vice-President Joseph
Stiglitz has delivered his third public lecture exposing
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the limits and fallacies of the doctrine. Neo-liberalism
was not some narrow intellectual conspiracy foisted
on the developing world by a clique of intellectuals,
ideologues and politicians rooted in Washington and
a few other major cities in the rich world. lt was, and
is, an intellectual movement of virtually global pro-
portions. It remains very influential. The core ideas of
the neo-liberais about poverty are ungenerous to the
poor, and their trust in the efficacy of public action
against poverty is low There is still a great deal to
combat. Ideology and culture are increasingly glob-
alised. Development fashions and ideologies are dis-
seminated outwards from Washington. But that
process takes time. Ideas that are being jettisoned in
Washington may just be making their mark on pub-
lic policies in countries of the South. Iliana Yaschine's
article ('The Changing Anti-Poverty Agenda: What
Can the Mexican Case Tell Us?') demonstrates how
Mexican government anti-poverty programmes are
moving steadily in a neo-liberal direction, becoming
less generous, more topdown, and more narrowly
targeted on the extreme poor. That is not because the
World Bank has any significant direct influence on
programme design in Mexico City, but because the
ruling ideas about governance among the Mexican
elite have become more neo-liberal through 'normal'
processes of globalisation, including the increasing
seniority of public officials who received their univer-
sity education in the United States.
Third, we question whether an internationally-
defined anti-poverty agenda, driven by the commit-
ment and money of the aid donors, really is such a
good thing. It might undermine rather than
enhance the effectiveness of anti-poverty efforts.
Should we not be looking to nationalise rather than
internationalise the anti-poverty agenda in poor
countries?
2 Ideas, Doctrines and History
John bye's article, 'Nationalising the Anti-Poverty
Agenda', provides the lead for the Bulletin in every
sense of the term. John begins from the history of
major public anti-poverty interventions in Europe.
He argues that these interventions were not driven
by universalistic or altruistic concerns on the part of
governments, elites or middle strata with poverty
per se, but by interpretations of the nature and
causes of poverty that were specific to culture, time
and place, and by motives that to modern eyes can
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easily appear self-interested and ignoble. National
elites did something about poverty because they
were persuaded that it was in their own interest to
reduce crime or disease, head off insurrection, or
rear a generation of young men fit enough to serve
in the army and thus protect the nation against the
BritishlFrenchlGerman threat. How public authori-
ties chose to intervene, and which of a range of
'poverties' they decided to target, depended on a
range of specific cultural, political and other factors.
To be induced to take action, elites had to believe
first that poverty created a problem for someone
else other than the poor themselves; second, that
some sections of the poor merited support rather
than simply repression and punishment; and third,
that public authorities actually possessed the means
to do something about the problem. Anti-poverty
interventions were diverse. Benign measures
intended to benefit the 'deserving poor' were often
packaged with harsh and punitive treatment of the
'non-deserving'. It was not always a pretty story
'Unwanted' children were being shipped from
Britain to the colonies as cheap labour long after the
foundations of the welfare state were in place. The
point from the European historical record is that
national elites developed moral and practical com-
mitments to do something about particular pover-
ties. John Toye worries that the internationalisation
of the anti-poverty agenda in poor countries will
undermine any national commitment that might
otherwise exist. International and aid organisations
define the problem. National governments and
elites in developing countries play little role.
International organisations are virtually obliged, for
operational purposes, to use some kind of money-
metric measures of poverty - for example, the
famous $1 a day This measure makes for interna-
tional comparability, but robs the definition of
poverty of any moral content, especially a moral
content that resonates locally Bangladeshi elites
may perhaps be willing to view a range of 'poverties'
as grounds for public support: the poverty of old
people with no surviving children; the poverty of
deserted mothers; the poverty of families who
struggle to send their children through school; the
poverty of the rickshaw-pullers who visibly work so
hard in city streets, etc. And each of these separate
poverties may afflict a sufficiently small number of
people that effective public action appears feasible.
By contrast, the claim that 57% of Bangladeshis are
poor according to the global standard because they
live on less than $1 a day rings no moral bells
locally and whispers: 'insuperable problem; turn
attention elsewhere'. That is not the way to per-
suade national governments and elites to take
poverty reduction seriously John Toye's paper is
short. Read it even if you read nothing else in this
Bulletin. It is guaranteed to make you think.
Like any other globally dominant idea, an 'interna-
tional' consensus about poverty in poor countries is
likely to be rooted more in some parts of the world
than in others. International ideas about poverty are
heavily influenced by aid donors and by econo-
mists. They are especially likely to be rooted in the
values, interests and influence of the contemporary
United States, in the intellectual traditions of the
Anglophone world, and in the neo-liberal ideas that
are themselves mainly an outgrowth of Anglo-
American worldviews and institutions. Several of
our contributors warn us against the global influ-
ence of this trinity: the US, Anglophonie, and neo-
liberalism. Ron Herring ('Persistent Poverty and
Path Dependency: Agrarian Reform Lessons from
the United States and India') argues that agrarian
reform is a precondition for effective poverty reduc-
tion in the transition from deeply hierarchical agrar-
ian society The elimination of the multiple
inequalities that cluster around major asset inequal-
ities are almost a condition for the success of other
anti-poverty measures. The recent experience of the
Indian state of Kerala illustrates the positive case,
while continuing deep racial and income inequali-
ties in the United States, and the socio-political ten-
sions and fractures associated with them, can be
explained by the failure to implement land reform
in the American South after the Civil War.
Redistributive land reform has been off the interna-
tional development policy agenda for a couple of
decades. Even now; the idea generates nervousness
from aid officials who otherwise suggest that all rad-
ical anti-poverty options are open to consideration.
Ron is telling them two things: the first is that redis-
tributive land reform can be highly complementary
with other anti-poverty measures; the second is that
it is inexcusable to hide behind the chant of 'land
reform is too difficult'. All anti-poverty policies are
difficult. Is 'pro-poor growth' any easier? Even its
original proponents admit to some ambiguity about
what it is, and ignorance about how to promote it.
In the case of land reform, at least we understand
what needs to be done and what tools are available.
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In Brazil at least, there is a strong consensus among
the national elite in support of land reform (see
Elisa Reis article). Although rooted in part in US
values and institutions, 'global' ideas about the best
route to reduce poverty do not even reflect a realis-
tic appraisal of US history.
In 'Perceptions of Poverty: The Historical Legacy',
Michael Ward makes a parallel case, contrasting two
historical traditions in official attitudes to conceptu-
alising and tackling poverty The English and
Anglophone tradition is 'miminalist', seeing poverty
as a material issue best dealt with through public
programmes that are limited in scale and focus on
selected poor individuals and households. By con-
trast, the French tradition is more generous (to those
defined as 'citizens'), integrationist and inclusionary
It focuses more on the societal causes and dimen-
sions of destitution/poverty/exclusion, and is more
likely to imply targeted public investment, especially
in infrastructure in poor areas and localities. No
prizes for guessing which of these two traditions
Michael identifies as dominant in the contemporary
international development community
Mick Moore's 'Politics Against Poverty? Global
Pessimism and National Optimism' targets contem-
porary 'global' ideas about the politics of poverty,
including the ways of thinking about the political
process that have formed much of the intellectual
core of neo-liberalism. These ideas are used to tell
the international development community that seri-
ous, redistributive anti-poverty policies are politi-
cally very difficult. They are misleading: logically
flawed, and inconsistent with actual experience in
developing countries. There is consistent exaggera-
tion of (a) the degree of societal conflict and polar-
isation that redistribution efforts are likely to
generate; and (b) the extent to which success
depends on mobilising large numbers of beneficia-
ries - the poor - behind a redistribution agenda and
movement, Conversely, there is consistent underes-
timation of (a) the extent to which members of
polïtical, governmental and other elites - and
indeed middle classes more generally - may per-
ceive themselves to have a positive interest in the
redistribution of income or assets to the poor; and
(b) the scope that reform-minded governments and
political leaders enjoy to exercise political leader-
ship in favour of redistribution: to control informa-
tion, manipulate symbols, determine agendas, take
initiatives, define the public interest, create coali-
tïons, and confuse opponents. Let us not think our-
selves into pessimism about the potential political
feasibility of action on poverty
3 Targeting the Poor Domestically
The New Poverty Agenda and neo-liberalism more
generally lead to 'targeting': the concentration of
public resources on a limited number of households
and individuals. The arguments of principle for and
against targeting have been well rehearsed. What
about the practical experience? Mexico is undergo-
ing a steady transition. There is a tradition of anti-
poverty programmes that are well-funded and
implemented in ways that are not only (a) highly
clientelistic, designed to create support for the rul-
ing party and president, but also (b) collectivist,
proving spaces for local groups to cooperate to
obtain and use anti-poverty resources partially
independent of party political affiliation. Iliana
Yaschine traces the growing influence of neo-liberal
ideas on succeeding generations of programmes,
especially the shift from PRONASOL to the current
PROGRESA. PROGRESA is narrower in scope, tàr-
geted on individual households rather than collec-
tivities, and provides much less scope for either
'local clientelist politics' (the sceptical interpreta-
tion) or 'local collective action on the part of the
poor' (the optimistic interpretation) in programme
implementation. Yet PROGRESA is in principle and
probably in practice more targeted on the poorest
20%, who tend to be rural and often missed out on
previous programmes.
It is too early to make any judgements about what
works best in Mexico. Stephen Devereux ('Targeting
Transfers: Innovative Solutions to Familiar Problems')
is willing to reach some policy conclusions from the
research he has been leading on targeted anti-poverty
programmes in Africa. Targeting entails a series of
costs as well as benefits. The practical task is not to
make general judgements about the relative merits or
not of targeting, but to look at the specific dilemmas
that arise in particular contexts and programmes, and,
in particular, to see how they have been alleviated or
solved locally As is so often the case, local adaptabil-
ity and experience obliges us to be sceptical of inter-
national conventional wisdom and of norms based on
logic rather than experience. Once again, beware the
international agenda.
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4 Targeting Poverty Internationally
International targets for poverty reduction have
become a part of the current international agenda.
We are very pleased to publish two articles that tell
us a great deal about that agenda. Simon Maxwell
('International Targets for Poverty Reduction and
Food Security: A Mildly Sceptical But Resolutely
Pragmatic View with a Call for Greater
Subsidiarity') very neatly summarises the argu-
ments for and against setting international targets in
relation to aid. He concludes, with some reserva-
tions, that we are better off with than without. In
'Are Poverty and Social Goals for the 21st Century
Attainable?', Lionel Demery and Michael Walton
present the most authoritative available estimates of
the feasibility of achieving by 2015 the social goals
to which the aid donors have signed up through the
OECD Development Assistance Committee. Lionel
and Michael do the job country by country, project-
ing forward on the basis of actual recent perfor-
mance. Are their conclusions optimistic or
pessimistic? Bear in mind that their estimates of
recent performance were made before the impact of
the Asian economic crisis in late 1997. Even before
that, it was going to be a very difficult task, espe-
cially to halve poverty in Africa and to cut infant
and child mortality by two thirds globally Now the
challenge is even greater. Let us hope that the tar-
gets were not set so high that they act as a depres-
sant rather than a stimulant to action.
5 National Elites and Poverty
Whose state of mind should we be thinking about?
It follows from John Toye's argument that we should
pay attention to national political elites in poor
countries. What do they think about the nature,
causes and solutions to poverty? Which of the many
potential poverties do they see as meriting public
action? How far and in what ways do they see
poverty as a threat to themselves and their families?
Which sections of the elite are most sympathetic to
doing something about poverty? What instruments
do they believe will be effective? These are very big
questions. lt is difficult to arrive at reliable and
comprehensive answers for any one country And
we can expect each case to differ. How can we
research these questions?
The IDS Poverty Research Programme, working in
association with the CROP (Comparative Research
on Poverty) network based in Bergen, has made a
start on this research. We have ongoing a series of
studies of national and, in India, state level elites.
We round off this Bulletïn with three summaries of
some initial findings from Bangladesh (Naomi
Hossain and Mick Moore), South Africa (Noushin
Kalati and James Manor) and Brazil (Elisa Reis). The
articles are intended to be read in the order in
which they appear, each reflecting on the article(s)
before it. The authors speak for themselves. Let us
consider here what these findings, limited and pre-
liminary as they are, appear to tell us about the use-
fulness of even asking the questions set out above.
Two generalisations appear to be emerging.
One is that, in our sample countries at least, it
would not be easy to mobilise elites to do some-
thing about poverty and certainly not the worst
poverty, by appealing to their fears. Poverty is not
generally perceived as a source of threat to the elites
themselves. At this moment in history fear of insur-
rection is muted. More surprising, the links
between poverty and crime provide little positive
leverage. All our elites see crime as a problem in
terms of their daily lives. White South African elites
are obsessed with crime, and do view measures to
tackle poverty as a potential solution. But the
'poverty' they link to crime is the unemployment of
young men in the black townships. The much more
acute poverty of the rural black population is barely
recognised, and not seen as problematic in the same
way At the other end of the scale, Bangladeshi elites
do not connect crime closely with poverty The
crime that concerns them is attributed not to the
poor - who are generally described in patronising
but benign terms - but to urban middle strata, often
connected to local politicians. Other potential
threats to the elites from poverty notably the threat
of disease transmission or the threat to national
security from an unhealthy population unfit for
national defence, barely feature at all within the
cognitive frames of our respondents.
If one hopes to use poverty-as-threat arguments to
stir those national elites into action, then our findings
so far are not very encouraging. However, reasoning
based on the notion of poverty-as-obstacle-to-devel-
opment appears more promising. Large sections of
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each of our three elites tended to view low levels of
education as the principle tangible cause of poverty
and to see more education as the best single solution.
Many respondents were unable to specify the causal
linkages more precisely A few people did perceive a
link from education to development in terms of the
quality of the labour force and national economic
competitiveness - and made plausible reference to
comparative national experiences. More common
was a highly unspecific and patronising conception
of the poor as 'ignorant' and 'unaware'. Quite how
education would help reduce poverty was unclear.
But John Toye has warned us not to dismiss the
strategic potential of perceptions that fail our tests of
moral correctness. 'Education' is a potential lever.
The case for more education for the poor can be
argued plausibly in terms of achieving other goals,
notably the two mentioned above: the contribution
to national economic performance and dispelling
'ignorance'. Once it is accepted that it is important
that poor children attend school, other anti-poverty
measures can be attached: health and nutrition pro-
grammes for poor children to ensure they make good
use of the education that we are generously providing
them; literacy and family planning for actual and
potential mothers so that the education we have so
carefully provided in schools does not become dissi-
pated at home; perhaps even allowances so that des-
titute mothers can afford to send their children to
school with clothes on their backs.
We are illustrating potential here, not trying to con-
struct yet another new international poverty agenda.
This potential will have to be realised principally in
local languages and idioms. If it does emerge that
bundles of ideas about the links between education,
the labour market, national economic peformance,
motherhood and gender provide a plausible basis on
which to convince some national elites to be more
active in tackling poverty then it will be a bonus that
they will be talking much the same language as the
international development community which cur-
rently places a great deal of faith in education. The
substance of some national poverty agendas may not
differ radically from international agendas. But it is
important that we demonstrate rather than assume
this, and, where they diverge, try to build first on the
national agendas.
